The Plan to stop Rommel
From Life Magazine
13th October 1958

All indications pointed to an early attack by Rommel. He would probably make his main effort on the south flank and would then carry out a right hook in order to get in behind the Eight Army. He would not leave the Army intact and pass on toward the fleshpots of Egypt; he must first destroy the Eight Army, after which the fleshpots were all his for the asking.

That being the case, the outline of my plan was at once clear. The Northern flank must be strengthened with mine fields and wire so that it could be held with a minimum of troops; I need not visit that front for the moment. The southern flank demanded careful consideration. I spent the day examining the ground. The key to the whole Alamein position was the Alam Halfa ridge, several miles in rear of the Alamein line. It was undefended because there were no troops available.

I had pondered deeply over what I had heard about armored battles in the desert and it seemed to me that what Rommel liked was to get our armor to attack him. He then disposed of his own armor behind a screen of antitank guns, knocked out our tanks and finally had the field to himself. I was determined that would not happen this time. His tanks would come up against our tanks dug in, in hull-down positions at the western edge of the Alam Halfa ridge.

I decided to ask GHQ for one new division to be sent to the Eight Army at once, and to position it to hold the Alam Halfa ridge. I asked that another should be sent to me later. And so by the 15th August, the day on which Auchinleck had order me to assume command of the Eight Army, I had already been in command for two days and we had got things moving in the right direction. Above all, by taking grip we had already achieved a definite lift in morale. This was important, as the spirit of the warrior is the greatest single factor in war.

The prime minister visited the Eight Army on the 19th August. He stayed that night with me at our headquarters on the shore near Burg El Arab, to which we had moved. He bathed in the Mediterranean before dinner. He had no bathing costume and I had some difficulty in keeping the press away as he walked toward the sea in his shirt. We had great fun that night in our mess and de Guingand had arranged suitable wine and old brandy for the prime minister.

I had made it clear to the Eight Army that "bellyaching" would not be tolerated. Previously, orders had generally been queried by subordinates right down the line. I was determined to stop this state of affairs at once. Orders no longer formed the base for discussion, but for action.

I had taken command of truly magnificent material, but officers and men were bewildered and this had led to a loss of confidence. "Brave but baffled," the prime minister had called them. This loss of confidence was becoming dangerous and could only be eradicated by a successful battle. I could not myself attack; Rommel must provide that opportunity for me.

I decided to hold the Alam Halfa ridge strongly with one infantry division and to locate my tanks just south of its western end. Once I was sure that the enemy main thrust was being directed against the Alam Halfa ridge. I planned to move the armor into the path of the attack. I was so sure that this movement would take place that I ordered it to be actually rehearsed, and when it did take place on the morning of the 1st September I had some 400 tanks in position, dug in and deployed behind a screen of antitank guns.

I had gone to bed at my usual time on the night of the 31st August and was asleep when Rommel's attack began soon after midnight. De Guingand tells his own story about that night. He decided he would wake me up and tell me the news. He said I merely replied, "Excellent, couldn't be better." and went to sleep again at once. I don't remember but am prepared to believe him. I was confident that if everyone obeyed orders we must win this battle.

We fought the battle as I had laid down. Once Rommel's forces had beaten up against our strong positions, they became unable to move. We then concentrated on shooting them up from all directions, and the Desert Air Force attacked then from the air. After a few days the enemy losses in vehicles were so severe that he had to consider a withdrawal.

When I saw that Rommel's forces were in a bad way, I ordered a thrust southward to close the gap through which they had entered our positions. The enemy reaction was immediate and violent. They began to pull back quickly to the area of our mine field through which they had originally come. We left them there and I called off the battle.

I have sometimes been criticised for not following up Rommel's withdrawal by launching the Eight Army to the attack. There were two reasons why I did not do so. First, I was not too happy about the standard of training of the army or the equipment situation. Second, I was not anxious to force Rommel to pull out. We would prefer to bring him to battle, when we were ready, at the end of a long and vulnerable line of communications - with ours short. Such would be his situation if he stood to fight at Alamein. Thus the battle of Alam Halfa ended in the way we wanted.

The Eight Army consisted in the main of civilians in uniform, not of professional soldiers. It seemed to me that to command such men demanded not only a guiding mind but also a point of focus - or to put it another way, not only a master but a mascot. I deliberately set about fulfilling this second requirement. It helped, I felt sure, for them to recognise as a person - as an individual - the man who was putting them into battle. To obey an impersonal figure was not enough. They must know who I was. This analysis may sound rather cold-blooded, a decision made in the study. And so, in origin, it was - and I submit, rightly so. I readily admit that the decision was personally enjoyable. For if I was able thereby to give them a sense of unity, the experience enabled me to get to know them too - and, as time went on, to feel the affection they generously extended to me.

I started in the Alam Halfa battle by wearing an Australian hat - first of all because it was an exceedingly good hat for the desert, but soon because I came to be recognised by it. Later I took to a black beret, again for utilitarian reasons in the first place. But what started as a private joke with the tank regiment which give it to me became in the end the means by which I came to be recognised throughout the desert. I soon learned that the arrival of the double-badged beret on the battlefield was a help. They knew that I was about, that I was taking an intense and personal interest in their doings and that I was not just sitting about somewhere safe in the rear, issuing orders. The beret was functional in the way a "brass hat" could never have been. It became, if you like, my signature. It was also very comfortable.

When the battle of Alam Halfa was over I wrote to a friend, in England, "My first encounter with Rommel was of great interest .... I feel that I have won the first game, when it was his service. Next time it will be my service, the score being one-love."

First, certain matters demanded immediate decision. Eighth Army leadership, equipment and training were deficient. I remember the shock I received on visiting a certain unit and asking the C.O. if he trained his officers,and how it was done. The C.O. replied without hesitation that he had handed that task over to his second-in-command. I came across the second-in-command later in the day and said, "I understand you are responsible for training the officers in the unit. Tell me how you do it." He replied that he did not do so, that it was done by the C.O. I ordered that a new C.O. be found for that unit at once; it was clear that nobody trained the officers.

On the higher level also I made extensive changes - two new corps commanders, a new general for the armored division, a new commander of artillery and many others. (When I told a senior officer at GHQ that I must have a new head gunner, he remarked that the present man was a delightful person and was also a golf champion. I agreed he was delightful but added that unfortunately the game we were about to play was not golf.)

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