A Difficult Task
From Life Magazine
13th October 1958

After the battle of Alam Halfa the basic problem that confronted us was a difficult one. The problem was, first, to punch a hole in the enemy positions; second, to pass my new 10th Corps, strong in armor and mobile troops, through his hole into the enemy territory; then, third, to develop operations so as to destroy Rommel's forces.

A full moon was necessary. The mine field problem was such that the troops must be able to see what they were doing. We could not be ready for the September moon and be sure of success. There must be no more failures. I notified Alexander that I would attack on the night of 23rd October.

The comeback from Whitehall was immediate. Alexander received a signal from the prime minister to the effect that the attack must be in September to synchronise with certain Russian offensives and with the Allied landings in French Morocco and Algeria early in November Alexander came to see me to discuss the reply to be sent. I said it would be madness to attack in September and that if a September attack was ordered by Whitehall, they would have to get someone else to do it. Alexander backed me up wholeheartedly as he always did. We heard no more about a September attack.

The gossip is, so I am told, that the plans for Alamein, and for the conduct of the war in Africa after that battle, were made by Alexander and that I merely carried them out. This is not true. All the plans were made at Eight Army HQ. I always kept Alexander fully informed. He never commented in detail on my plans or suggested any of his own. He trusted me and my staff absolutely.

The initial plan for Alamein was to attack the enemy simultaneously on both flanks. The main attack would be made in the north and here I planned to punch two corridors through the enemy defenses and mine fields. The 10th Corps would then pass through these corridors and would position itself astride the enemy supply routes. Rommel's armor would have to attack it and would, I hoped, be destroyed in the process. In the south and plan was to break into the enemy positions and draw enemy armor in that direction; this would make it easier for the 10th Corps to get out into the open in the north.

But it was becoming apparent to me that the Eight Army was very untrained. By the end of September there were serious doubts in my mind whether the troops would be able to do what was being demanded. I took a quick decision. On the 6th October, just over two weeks before the battle was to begin, I changed the plan. My initial plan had been based on destroying Rommel's armor. My modified plan now was to hold off the enemy armor. The unarmored divisions would then be destroyed by means of a "crumbing" process, being attacked from the flank and rear and cut off from their supplies. The enemy armor probably would be launched in heavy counter-attacks. This would suit us very well since the best way to destroy the enemy armor was to entice it to attack our armor in position.

The success of the whole operation would depend largely on whether the troops in the north could succeed in the break-in battle and establish the corridors through which the armored divisions of the 10th Corps must pass. I was certain that if we could get the leading armored brigades through the corridors without too great delay, then we would win the battle. I therefore planned to launch the armored divisions of the 10th Corps into the corridors before I know the corridors were clear. Furthermore, I ordered that if the corridors were not completely clear on the morning of D+1, the 24th October, the armored divisions would fight their own way out into the open. This order was not populate with the armored units but I was determined to see that it was carried out to the letter.

There was a Major "Bill" Williams on my intelligence staff who appeared to me to be of outstanding ability. One day about this time, he pointed out to me that Rommel had so deployed his German infantry that they were positioned between, and in some places behind, his unreliable Italian troops. Williams' idea was that if we could separate the two, we could smash through a purely Italian front without any great difficulty. This very brilliant idea paved the way to final victory at Alamein.

On the 23rd October I issued the following personal message to the officers and men of the army:

"When I assumed command of the Eight Army I said that the mandate was to destroy Rommel and his Army, and that it would be done as soon as we were ready."

"We are ready NOW..."

That evening I read a book and went to bed early. At 9.40pm the barrage of over 1,000 guns opened, and the Eighth Army went into the attack. At that moment I was asleep in my caravan. There was nothing I could do and I knew I would be needed later. There is always a crisis in every battle when the issue hangs in the balance, and I reckoned I would get what rest I could while I could. As it turned out my intervention was needed sooner than I expected.

Trouble in the corridors

The two corridors in the north had not been completely opened for the armored division of the 10th Corps by 8am on the 24th October. In accordance with my orders I expected the armored divisions to fight their way way out into the open. But I gained the impression during the morning that they were pursing a policy of inactivity. I sent for Lieut. General Herbert Lumsden and told him he must drive his divisional commanders, and if there was any more hanging back I would remove them from command and put in more energetic personalities. This action produced immediate results. By 6pm that evening one armored brigade of the 10th Corps was out in the open in the northern corridor. It was then attacked by the 15th Panzer Division, which was exactly what I wanted.

Sunday, the 25th October was when the real crisis occurred. At 1.30am the 10th Corps reported that the breakout in the southern corridor was not proceeding well. The divisional commander had said he did not feel happy about the operation and that even if he did get out he would be in a very unpleasant position. His division was untrained and not fit for such difficult operations. He wanted to stay where he was. Lumsden was inclined to agree. In the northern corridor one entire armored division was now out in the open and was being furiously attacked by the enemy armor - which was exactly what the doctor ordered, so long as I was the doctor in question! De Guingand rightly issued orders for a conference at my Tactical HQ at 3.30am and then came and woke me and told me what he had done. I agreed.

When Leese and Lumsden, the two corps commanders, arrived I discovered that one regiment of the lagging armored division was already out in the open in the southern corridor and that it was hoped more would be out by dawn. The divisional commander wanted to withdraw it all back behind the mine field so his division would not suffer heavy casualties. I got the divisional commander on the telephone and discovered to my horror that he himself was nearly 10 miles behind his leading armored brigades. I spoke to him in no uncertain voice and ordered him to go forward at once and take charge of his battle. He was to fight his way out and led his division from in front, not from behind.

I then told both corps commanders that there would be no departure from my plan. I kept Lumsden behind and spoke very plainly to him. I said I was determined that the armored divisions would get out into the open. If he himself, or the commander of his lagging armored division, was not for it, then I would appoint others who were.

By 8am all my armor was out in the open and we were in the position I had hoped to have achieved at 8am the day before. By Wednesday hard fighting had been going on for three days and I began to realise from the casualty figures that I must be careful. I knew that the final blow must be put in and I had to get ready for it. We now had Rommel's Panzer Army opposite the northern corridor and I knew we would never break out from there. So I made that area a defensive front and began pulling my armor into reserve to get it ready for the breakout.

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