Desert Daring
From Life Magazine
13th October 1958

Starting his memoirs, the great general tells how he disobeyed orders, took over a whipped army, changed strategy - and smashed the Germans.

By Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein

Early in August 1942, while I was in Scotland observing a training exercise, the war office telephoned me to return at once I was to take over command of the First Army and begin work on the plans for the landing in North Africa in November.

As I was staying in London the morning after my return the War Office telephoned again and said those orders were cancelled. I was to proceed to Egypt to take command of the Eight Army in the desert. The general scheduled to take command had been killed.

General Sir Harold Alexander was already in Egypt and I would be serving under him. I was to take command of an army which was at grips with a German and Italian army under the command of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, of whom I had heard great things. This was to my liking and I felt I could handle that business, and Rommel. It was true that I had never fought in the desert and I would have under me some very experienced generals who had been out there for a long time. However Rommel seemed to have defeated them all, and I would like to have a crack at him myself.

I left England by air on the night of the 10th August. During the journey I pondered over the problems which lay ahead. From what I read and heard, Rommel's forces consisted of holding troops, who manned static defense positions, and mobile troops used to counterattack and to form the spearhead of offensives. The holding forces consisted largely of Italians and were mostly unarmored. The mobile forces were German and for the greater part armored. The corps d'elite was the Panzer Army.

I came to the conclusion that the Eight Army must have its own Panzer Army - a corps strong in armor, well equipped and well trained. It must never hold static fronts, it would be the spearhead of our offensive. The formation of this corps of three or four divisions must be a priority task. Then there was the question of morale. From what I had learned the troops had their tails down and there was no confidence in the higher command. This would have to be put right at once.

I arrived at Cairo early on the 12th August. I was taken straight to General Sir Claude Auchinleck, who was still Commander in Chief of the Middle East, although General Alexander was soon to relieve him. Auchinleck took me into his maproom and shut the door. He explained to me his plan of operations; at all costs the Eight Army was to be preserved "in being" and must not be destroyed in battle. If Rommel attacked in strength, as was expected soon, the Eight Army would fall back on the Delta. If Cairo and the Delta could not be held, the army would retreat southward up the Nile, or would withdraw to Palestine. I listened in amazement. I asked one or two questions, but quickly saw that he resented any questions directed to immediate changes of policy about which he had already made up his mind. So I remained silent. He then said I was to go down to the desert the next day and spend two days at Eight Army HQ, getting into the picture and learning the game. He was himself still commanding the Eight Army HQ and he had ordered Acting Lieut. General William Ramsden to act for him. I was not to take over command till the 15th August, the day on which he would hand over to Alexander. In the event of some crisis occurring, he himself would at once come to Eight Army HQ and take direct command again from Ramsden. It all seemed most peculiar and I got out of the room as soon as I decently could. I then went in search of Alexander; I soon found him in the headquarters, calm, confident and charming as always. I outlined to him my ideas and got his general agreement to the course of action I would pursue in the Eight Army.

At 5 a.m. on the 13th August I left to go down to the desert. On the way the Director of Military Intelligence in the Middle East, Brigadier (now Major General Sir Francis) de Guingand gave me a first class review of the situation and the causes of it. Freddie de Guingand and I were old friends. He had a quick and fertile brain and I had in the past regarded him a an outstanding officer. I asked him about the morale of the officers and men. He said it wasn't good. The Eight Army wanted a clear lead and a firm grip from the top. There was too much uncertainty and he thought the "feel of the thing" was wrong.

The need for a chief of staff

The magnitude of the task in front of me was beginning to be apparent. I must have someone to help me, a man with a quick and clear brain, who would accept responsibility and who would work out the details and leave me free to concentrate on the major issues, in fact a chief of staff.

Was Freddie de Guingand this man? We were completely opposites, he lived on his nerves and was high strung, in ordinary life he liked wine, gambling and good food. Did these differences matter? I quickly decided they did not. Indeed differences were assets.

Before we arrived at Eight Army HQ I had decided that de Guingand was the man. I would make him my chief of staff with full powers and together we would do the job. But I did not tell him then.

When we arrived at the desert headquarters of the Eight Army at about 11am the sight that met me was enough to lower anyone's moral. It was a desolate scene, a few trucks, no mess tents, flies everywhere. I asked where Auchinleck used to sleep. I was told that he slept on the ground outside his caravan. Tents were forbidden in the Eight Army, everyone was to be as uncomfortable as possible. I asked where was the Air Force HQ, I was told it was many miles back. The Army and the Air Forces appeared to be fighting two separate battles. The Acting Army Commander, General Ramsden, met me. I cross-examined him about plans for a withdrawal if Rommel attacked, but I had difficult extracting from him exactly what was to be done. There was an air of uncertainty about everything.

It was clear to me that the situation was quite unreal and, in fact, dangerous, I decided at once to take action. I had been ordered not to take over command of the Eight Army till the 15th August; it was still only the 13th. I knew it was useless to consult GHQ and that I must take full responsibility myself. I told General Ramsden he was to return at once to his corps. He seemed surprised, but he went. I then had lunch, with the flies and in the hot sun. During lunch I did some savage thinking. After lunch I wrote a telegram to GHQ saying that I had assumed command of Eight Army. This was disobedience, but there was no comeback. I then cancelled all previous orders about withdrawal. We would fight on the ground we now held and if we couldn't stay there alive we would stay there dead.

I decided to leave the HQ quickly in case any repercussions came from GHQ about my sudden seizure of command. But before going I told de Guingand to assemble the whole staff at 6pm that evening so that I could speak to them. I set out for the southern flank. On the way I sat in the back of the car and studied the map. My guide, an officer of Army HQ sat in front with the driver. After a time the car stopped and I asked my guide if he knew where we were. He said he was lost. I then noticed we were inside a large wired-in enclosure and I asked what it was. He said we were in the middle of a mine field. I wasn't too pleased. I told the drive to back the car along our tracks till we were out of the mine field, by which time my guide had located himself and we started off again.

I got back to Army HQ rather late and found the staff waiting for me. I introduced myself and said I wanted to explain things. We needed more troops in the Eight Army in order to make my "no withdrawal" order a possibility. Two new divisions had arrived from England and were being used to dig positions to defend the Delta; I would get them out here.

Then from all the bits and pieces in Egypt I was going to form a new corps, the 10th Corps, strong in armor. This would be to us what the Africa Corps was to Rommel. The policy of lighting the enemy with divisions split up all over the desert was to cease. In future divisions would fight as divisions.

I did not like the atmosphere I found at Army HQ. No one could have a high morale in a dismal place like this and in such discomfort. We ought to have the headquarters by the sea, where we could work hard, bathe and be happy.

My orders from General Alexander were quite simply - to destroy Rommel and his army. I understood that Rommel was excepted to attack us shortly, If he came soon it would be tricky, but give us two weeks and Rommel could do what he liked. I had no intention of launching our attack until we were ready. When that time came we would hit Rommel for six right out of Africa.

I appointed de Guingand Chief of Staff of the Eight Army; every order given by him would be regarded as coming from me and would be obeyed instantly.

My talk was listened to in complete silence, but it certainly had a profound effect. A spirit of hope, anyway of clarity, was born that evening. There was to be no more uncertainty about anything. But the old hands thought that my knees were very white!

My first day in the desert had been a good one, though long and tiring. I'm afraid that it was with an insubordinate smile that I fell asleep: I was issuing orders to an army which someone else reckoned he commanded!

I was woken up soon after dark the next morning by an officer with the morning situation report. I was extremely angry and hold him no one was ever to come near me with such details. He apologised profusely and said that Auchinleck was always woken early and given the dawn report. I said I was not Auchinleck and that if anything was wrong the chief of staff would tell me; if nothing was wrong I didn't want to be told. The offending officer was very upset. So we had an early morning cup of tea together and a good talk, and he went away comforted.

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